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1 Introduction
When developing an invention into a commercial product requires signicant resources, just a few
rms may compete for positions in an industry either as a rst-mover or as a second entrant. In
these circumstances the timing of product introductions is determined by investment strategies
that are driven by the relative costs of innovation and imitation. These strategies accordingly
respond to policy variables that impact the cost of imitation, and whose choice should therefore
account for the dynamics of industry investments.
In a model of dynamic competition to develop a new product, we therefore study the e¤ect
of the relative costs of innovation and imitation on the investment strategies of rms when their
roles as innovator or imitator are endogenous and characterize the regulators choice of optimal
intellectual property right (IPR) levels. By identifying the role played by the drift and volatility
of product market demand on the timing of innovative and imitative investments and hence on
economic welfare, we contribute novel insights concerning minimum IPR levels, the necessity of
strong IPRs in mature industries, and the importance of fostering dynamic competition between
rms.
If innovation has positive spillovers for an imitator attrition may arise, and it is all the more
likely when demand growth and volatility are high. A socially optimal level of IPRs involves a
minimum cost of imitating that we identify. If demand growth and volatility are low, as typically
occurs in mature industries, we show that a high level of IPR protection which induces a pre-
emption race constitutes a second-best from a welfare standpoint in a broad range of situations.
If demand growth and volatility are su¢ ciently low, it is even socially desirable to provide inno-
vators with complete protection and have strategic investment take the form of winner-take-all
preemption, so that dynamic competition is intense enough that the rms invest at the net present
value threshold as would occur in a competitive industry. The endogeneity of innovation timing
plays a key role in establishing these results, and we show that a regulator who did not account
for the full range of dynamic competition would run the risk of concluding erroneously that it is
optimal not to enforce any IPRs.
To establish these conclusions, we study the exercise of strategic growth options by two initially
identical rms pursuing the development of a product for a new market in which they are potential
horizontal competitors.1 Development of innovative and imitative products requires di¤ering
stationary levels of irreversible investment which may or may not be related to the exploitation
1Our focus on these industries is therefore complementary to research on cumulative innovation such as Green
and Scotchmer [13].
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of a single patent, and occurs in a context of market uncertainty as the scale of demand follows
a geometric Brownian motion.2 Both rms independently choose thresholds that determine the
timing of their investment in product development, which once performed yields an immediate
and perpetual prot ow whose level at any moment depends on the number of active rms.
We thus study a real option game,3 but depart from existing models by introducing an ex-post
asymmetry through the di¤ering xed costs of innovation and imitation that rms face and by
considering the full range of relative xed costs. Our model therefore allows just as well for
broad IPRs implying a relatively high cost of imitation and preemption between rms as well as
for signicant spillovers resulting in a comparatively low cost of imitation and attrition between
rms.
The imitation cost provides us with a way to parametrize rst- and second-mover advantage
parsimoniously and to nest within a single framework two important timing games, the war
of attrition (Hendricks et al. [14]) and preemption (Fudenberg and Tirole [10]).4 The timing
game we study involves rms choosing investment thresholds, or hurdle rates, that determine
stochastic investment times, and has a straightforward normal form. We characterize the unique
symmetric equilibrium in investment threshold choices. This analysis provides the foundation for
the subsequent welfare results which are the main focus of this paper, and we complement it with
a more technical discussion of closed-loop strategies in continuous time in the appendix.
After characterizing investment timing and optimal imitation cost levels in a benchmark case
where rms invest according to a predetermined sequence instead of engaging in dynamic com-
petition (Proposition 1), we derive the equilibrium timing of innovation for di¤erent levels of
the imitation cost and identify a critical imitation cost, bK, which determines whether strategic
competition between rms takes the form of attrition or preemption (Proposition 2). For extreme
values of the cost of imitation, we nd that dynamic competition has the form of a standard
timing game. A very low imitation cost leads to a situation of attrition as rms seek to enter
second, delaying product introduction and inducing immediate imitation.5 Conversely a very high
imitation cost leads to a situation of preemption as rms seek to enter rst and enjoy a phase
2We focus on market uncertainty rather than R&D uncertainty, which has been extensively studied by the patent
race literature (see e.g. Denicolò [5]).
3See Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [3] for a presentation of these games where rms balance the value of
retaining exibility in the face of uncertainty with the strategic incentive to invest early.
4The extension of these games to the stochastic case itself presents a number of challenges (Thijssen et al. [26],
Steg and Thijssen [24]).
5Our model thus encompasses the dynamics described by Scherer (quoted in Fudenberg and Tirole [10]) as
each industry member holding back initiating its R&D e¤ort in the fear that rapid imitation by others will be
encouraged, more than wiping out its innovative prots.
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of monopoly prot before imitation occurs. Intermediate values of the imitation cost result in
hybrid forms of dynamic competition: a waiting game in which rm investment thresholds are
continuously distributed over a disconnected support if the imitation cost is moderately low, and
a preemption race in which an attrition phase occurs o¤ the equilibrium path if the imitation cost
is moderately high.
Provided that innovation has positive spillovers attrition may occur, and it is more likely if
there is a low degree of product market competition or if market growth and volatility are high
(Proposition 3). This is because high growth and volatility raise the option value of delaying
investment, eventually compensating for the lost monopoly prot phase if a rm enters second
and imitates instead of innovating. A key additional result concerns the optimal balance between
rst- and second-mover advantage from the standpoint of the industry. Under both attrition and
preemption, positional rents are dissipated in the symmetric equilibrium and expected industry
value is therefore maximized if the imitation cost attains the critical level bK at which there is
neither a war of attrition nor a preemption race, so that rms do not compete for positional rents
by either unduly waiting or rushing to innovate (Proposition 4).
Because of the tractability of the equilibrium we characterize, we are able to study socially
optimal IPR levels if a regulator adjusts the cost incurred by an imitator through either legislative
measures or enforcement. With dynamic competition the welfare trade-o¤ associated with raising
the imitation cost is more involved than a straight balancing of the incentive to innovate against
the deadweight loss of monopoly, as the e¤ect of higher imitation cost on the timing of imita-
tion is ambiguous under attrition. We identify a lower bound on the socially optimal imitation
cost (Proposition 5), which must provide su¢ cient quasi-rents for rms to avoid the Schererian
dynamics described above (cf. footnote 5).
Even if it is generally challenging to draw broad conclusions regarding optimal IPR levels, we
are able to show that if the static entry incentive is socially excessive, as occurs in the presence of a
business-stealing e¤ect, an imitation cost that induces preemption is optimal when market growth
and volatility are su¢ ciently low (Proposition 6). The model therefore provides an argument for
strong IPRs in such industries based on objective characteristics of market uncertainty. In passing
we obtain closed-form expressions for the optimal threshold for innovation and the resulting level
of welfare under preemption (Lemma 1), establishing that a limit imitation cost level which results
in winner-take-all preemption is socially optimal when there is su¢ cient discounting. Moreover
we provide specic economic circumstances where the optimal imitation cost is consistent either
with attrition or preemption, such as a low consumer surplus from innovation or collusion in the
product market (Proposition 7).
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These welfare results take on particular relevance when they are compared with the optimal
welfare levels obtained without accounting for the endogeneity of innovation or for the full range
of dynamic competition, as is often the case in the economic literature on patents. A regulator
following this kind of approach could be led to set the level of IPR protection much too low, when
in fact competition between rms to innovate plays a vital role and is best incentivized with levels
of imitation cost in the preemptive range (Proposition 8). Moreover the comparison of welfare
levels that a regulator achieves with and without allowing for dynamic competition casts doubt
on the merit of any policy that might involve picking an industrial champion to invest rst, even
if is complemented by e¢ cient IPR levels.
Finally we discuss several extensions of the model. First, we endogenize the cost of imita-
tion by allowing the innovator to pursue patent protection more aggressively or to make reverse
engineering of its product more di¢ cult. A higher baseline cost of imitation reduces the e¤ort ex-
erted by innovators to raise entry barriers, and rms are shown to gain from coordinating ex-ante
not to introduce subsequent complexity, a policy that may be thought of as an open standard
(Proposition 9). We also discuss contracting between innovator and imitator that can take the
form either of a takeover or of a license agreement, and show that e¢ ciency always increases in
the latter case (Proposition 10).
Our paper is related to early research on innovation incentives and optimal patents, and in
particular to Gallini [11] who introduces a cost of imitation that the regulator may use as a policy
instrument. We similarly emphasize the role of measures like patent breadth in determining the
cost of inventing around an existing innovation, but in contrast with this earlier work we account
for the endogenous timing of innovation and thus allow rms to wait before investing rather than
assuming that product development occurs when its net present value is positive. Denicolò [5]s
model of optimal IPR protection in a patent race is therefore closer to our work, as it formalizes
innovation and imitation as the outcome of a non-cooperative interaction that precedes market
competition, though in contrast our model allows for second-mover advantage and attrition, which
likely arises in industries with high growth and volatility.
Our work is therefore also related to papers which study the e¤ect of second-mover advan-
tage on investment decisions, most often as a result of explicit informational spillovers. Hoppe
[17] allows for uncertainty regarding the success of new technology adoption to benet a rivals
innovation decision whereas in Thijssen et al. [25] information regarding the value of a project
arrives continuously over time. Femminis and Martini [9] allow for a disclosure lag of random
duration before the follower receives the information. In these models, both preemption and attri-
tion can occur depending on the level of spillovers, but the welfare analysis is either based on pure
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strategy equilibrium or restricted to preemption regimes. Our analysis characterizes the welfare
properties of symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium over a complete range, providing intuitive
analytic results regarding optimal IPRs that are related in our model to the dynamic properties
of demand.
Our welfare results can be related to several papers that compare welfare across two key
alternative policy regimes, a strict winner-take-all regime where only the rst rm to innovate
receives a patent, and a more permissive regime where late investors are allowed to compete with
the rst before its patent expires. In La Manna, Macleod, and de Meza [19] rms spend a xed
initial amount in R&D that determines a probability of inventing at a future date. Simple cost
and demand conditions, such as constant returns to scale and a linear demand, are identied
for the permissive regime to be welfare superior. Henry [15] introduces a mechanism whereby a
late inventor can share the patent with the innovator within a given time period. When adjusted,
together with other policy instruments, this mechanism is socially benecial under mild conditions,
notably with a linear demand and quantity competition. However, in a model where rms incur
a ow cost, in Denicolò and Franzoni [7] it is the strict patent regime that is found to be optimal
in a broad set of circumstances, in particular when demand is linear, product market competition
is weak, and duplication ow costs are large. Our approach is broadly consistent with these
contributions, but we characterize an optimal degree of IPRs with the winner-take-all regime
occurring as a limit case rather than evaluating a discrete set of regimes. Moreover, the model of
investment under market uncertainty allows us to identify determinants of optimal protection that
are not considered in this stream of literature related to measurable properties of the dynamics
of markets.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies a benchmark case in which the roles of
rms are predetermined. Section 4 characterizes the symmetric equilibrium when rms engage in
dynamic competition. Section 5 studies welfare when a regulator determines the cost of imitation.
Section 6 discusses two extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 A model of new product development
This section sets up a model of strategic investment in product development that reects the
characteristic features of innovation and imitation discussed in the introduction. The main as-
sumptions are presented in Section 2.1, the continuation payo¤s that rms obtain once innovation
occurs in Section 2.2, and Section 2.3 describes the relationship between the conguration payo¤s
and imitation cost that provides the intuition for much of the analysis in the paper.
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2.1 Assumptions
Two identical rms engage in dynamic competition to introduce their version of a novel product
in an evolving market. Organizational constraints prevent a rm from developing two variants of
the novel product and entry barriers shield both rms from other competitors.
Introduction of the product immediately generates a perpetual prot ow whose baseline value
is denoted M if a single rm is active in the market and D if both are, with 0 < 2D  M .
A rm that introduces its product rst is said to be an innovator and if a rm introduces its
product second it is referred to as the imitator. The baseline prot ow is scaled by a measure of
market size Yt, t  0, so ow prots to active rms at a given time are either MYt or DYt. To
capture the idea that demand for the new product evolves in a context of market uncertainty, the
measure of market size is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion dYt = Ytdt+ YtdWt
where Wt is a standard Wiener process and  and   0 are the drift and volatility. Both rms
have a common discount rate r.
Product development involves an irreversible investment which encompasses standard setup
costs associated with bringing a product to market such as dedicated plant, equipment and mar-
keting expenses as well as the cost of developing the rms product variant. The xed costs of
innovation and imitation are respectively denoted I and K. While I is assumed to be positive
and nite, the extreme cases K = 0 and K = 1 are allowed and we are agnostic about the
relative magnitudes of I and K.6 If the second rm can develop an equivalent product completely
independently then K = I, whereas if there are positive spillovers K < I; and with scarce inputs
or IPR protection that compels imitators to invent around any intellectual property held by the
innovator K > I can hold.7
6Within the biopharmaceutical industry for instance, the cost of imitation varies across business segments. The
conditions of imitation for drugs strongly di¤er from those for vaccines. Pharmaceutical rms rely on intellectual
property rights in order to increase the costs of imitators for new drugs which otherwise could be copied more easily
than products whose production processes can be kept secret, or for which the time and relative expense needed
to copy the invention are much higher (Scherer and Watal [27], p. 4). If such patent protection is not available,
a generic product can be introduced at a much lower xed cost than incurred by the branded product supplier.
However, this ease of imitation is not found in the case of vaccines, which are made from living micro-organisms,
and unlike drugs are not easily reverse-engineered, as the greatest challenges often lie in details of production
processes that cannot be inferred from the nal product, implying that there is technically no such thing as a
generic vaccine(Wilson [28], p. 13).
7 Imperfect competition in the input market can also lead to asymmetric xed costs for initially identical rms.
Billette de Villemeur et al. [1] show for example that if the cost of investment is determined endogenously by a
monopoly input supplier, the xed cost is lower for the rst rm that invests.
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To derive welfare results we suppose that like prots, the baseline consumer surplus ows
under monopoly and duopoly, SM and SD with 0 < SM  SD, are scaled by the market size
parameter Yt, and that the social discount rate is equal to r. The static welfare gain from
imitation, (SD + 2D)   (SM + M ), plays a key role in our normative analysis. A standard
result in industrial economics is that in a broad range of oligopoly models, the static welfare gain
is lower than the private entry incentive D,8 and we appeal to this result further below to identify
certain welfare e¤ects.
Finally in order for the investment problems we study to be economically meaningful we
assume that r > , and to focus on cases where rms to prefer to delay initially we assume
Y0  (r   ) I=M .
2.2 Continuation payo¤s
Firms obtain continuation payo¤s once innovation occurs which are determined by their position
in the investment sequence. These payo¤s are dened for a given value y = Y0 of the market
size process as functions of the market size at which innovation occurs, which is denoted Y and
satises Y  y. They thus represent the current values of anticipated rather than instantaneous
payo¤s, and as in the literature they are denoted F , L and M according to whether a rm invests
as a follower, as a leader or if investments are simultaneous.
The continuation payo¤ of a follower is obtained by studying the decision problem of a rm
once its rival has innovated. It then holds a growth option on a duopoly market and its optimal
policy is to develop the imitative product whenever the market reaches an optimal threshold,
denoted YF . Standard arguments (see Section A.1) establish that the instantaneous value at the
threshold Y of this option is
VD (Y ) =
(
ADY
, Y < YF
D
r Y  K, Y  YF
(1)
where  is shorthand for the function of parameters
 (; ; r) :=
1
2
  
2
+
s
1
2
  
2
2
+
2r
2
, (2)
YF := ( (r   )K) = ((   1)D) is the optimal duopoly investment threshold and AD :=
D= (   1) 1 (r   )K 1 is a constant. The discounting parameter (2) satises  > 1
8Specically this holds in industries where entry raises industry output, there is a business-stealing e¤ect and
rms do not price below marginal cost (Mankiw and Whinston [20]).
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and @=@; @=@; @=@r < 0.9 The expected discounted value at time t = 0 of obtaining the
duopoly option VD (Y ) at Y when rival innovation occurs is then
F (Y ) = Ey
"Z 1
(maxfY;YF g)
DYse
 rsds  e r(maxfY;YF g)K
#
=
8<: ADy, Y < YF D
r Y  K
   y
Y
 , Y  YF . (3)
Given that the optimal policy of the follower is to invest once the threshold YF is reached, the
leader payo¤ at time t = 0 from innovating at a threshold Y is
L (Y ) = Ey
"Z (maxfY;YF g)
(Y )
MYse
 rsds  e r(Y )I +
Z 1
(maxfY;YF g)
DYse
 rsds
#
=

M
r   Y   I
 y
Y
   M   D
r   
y
[max fY; YF g] 1
(4)
where in the rst line  (Z) = inf f t  0jYt  Zg denotes the stochastic time at which the market
size process rst hits a threshold Z (see Section A.2). The rst summand in (4) corresponds
to the discounted value of perpetual monopoly prots for an innovator and the second corrects
for the anticipated reduction in prot ow stemming from the rival rms entry. Finally if both
rms invest together at a market size threshold Y the continuation payo¤ from simultaneous
investments is
M (Y ) = Ey
"Z 1
(Y )
DYse
 rsds
#
=

D
r   Y   I
 y
Y

: (5)
Note that this formulation assumes that the xed cost is I for both rms, which can be due to a
lag for information spillovers to take place that is not modeled explicitly for example.10
9A standard property of  which is apparent in the continuation payo¤s in the text is that the expected discounted
value of a monetary unit received at the stochastic time  (Y ) when the process rst hits a threshold Y  y is
Eye r(Y ) = (y=Y ) . Note that lim!0  = r=.
10An alternative assumption would be that xed costs are attributed randomly when investments are simultaneous
so the expected xed cost at the moment of investment is (I +K)=2. In this case the rst intersection of L and M
is no longer at YF and M and F do not overlap beyond max fYF ; YMg where the threshold YM is dened further
below in the text.
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2.3 Continuation payo¤ congurations and critical imitation costs eK and bK
The relative positions of F;L and M are determined by the level of K, and in turn deter-
mine key features of the model such as whether rms enjoy a rst or a second-mover advan-
tage upon investment. To characterize these payo¤ functions, three critical levels of the im-
itation cost, eK; bK and I with eK < bK < I delimit four typical congurations of the con-
tinuation payo¤s that are represented in Figures 1   4.11 The rst two critical values, eK =
 ((M=D)  1) =

(M=D)
   1
1=( 1)
I and bK = (1 +  ((M=D)  1)) = (M=D)1=( 1) I,
are solutions to the conditions L (YL) = M (YM ) and L (YL) = F (YL) respectively which are de-
rived in Section A.2.3 where YL := ( (r   ) I) = ((   1)M ) and YM := ( (r   ) I) = ((   1)D).
For K < eK (Figure 1),12 F > L for all Y  y and L has a global maximum at YM . ForeK < K < bK (Figure 2), F > L for all Y  y but the global maximum of L is at YL. Observe
that L is not monotonic to the right of its global maximum in this case and that there is a local
maximum at YS . For bK < K < I (Figure 3), F < L over an interval  YP ; Y P  that includes YL.
Finally, for K > I (Figure 4), F < L for all Y  y.
Although the exact relationship between these functions is involved, there is a general intuition
regarding the e¤ect of imitation cost on payo¤s that is apparent in the gures. Starting at the
lower bound of the cost of imitation K = 0, the follower payo¤ is globally higher than the leader
payo¤ (F > L). Raising the level of K increases the follower investment threshold YF and shifts
F downward, but conversely this higher investment threshold lengthens the monopoly phase for
a rm that innovates before the follower threshold is reached and raises the leader payo¤, shifting
L upward over the range (y; YF ). As the cost of imitation becomes large enough (K > I), the
leader payo¤ eventually becomes globally higher than the follower payo¤ (F < L).
3 Benchmark: predetermined investment sequence
To get a rst insight about the dynamics of innovation and imitation in our model we begin by
examining the case of exogenous rm roles. One way this situation arises is through industrial
policy, for example if a former state-run monopolist enjoys priority market access in a dereg-
ulated industry. This case is also a useful rst step from a theoretical standpoint because its
11The pivotal cases K 2
n eK; bK; Io are not shown but are straightforward to obtain from the cases that are
shown in the gures by continuity of F , L and M in K.
12Figure 1 is drawn assuming K > K := (D=M )I. Below this value, YF < YL and F is decreasing over (y;1)
but the key properties of F;L and M described in the text still hold.
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equilibrium, whose derivation is straightforward, provides a useful comparison with the endoge-
nous rm roles case that we study afterward, particularly with respect to the contrasting industry
prot-maximizing and socially optimal imitation cost levels we obtain.
3.1 Industry equilibrium
Suppose that the order of investments is exogenously xed with rm 1 developing its product rst
whereas rm 2 must wait for rm 1s variant to be introduced before developing its own product.
Let Yi, i 2 f1; 2g denote rm is investment threshold with rm 2s threshold constrained to
satisfy Y2  Y1. With these assumptions the equilibrium pattern of investments is found by
backward induction as in a standard Stackelberg duopoly model. We therefore rst identify rm
2s optimal investment threshold, denoted Y F2 (Y1), and then rm 1s optimal forward-looking
investment threshold, denoted Y L1 .
Firm 2 solves the follower problem described at the beginning of Section 2.2. As it is con-
strained by Y = Y1, its optimal investment threshold is Y F2 = max fYF ; Y1g and it obtains the
payo¤F (Y1). The leader payo¤L(Y1) that rm 1 gets is given by (4), which directly incorporates
the reaction of rm 2. Its decision problem is therefore maxY1y L(Y1). The unique solution is
Y L1 = YL, and rm 1 obtains the payo¤ L(YL).
With exogenous rm roles and hence sequential threshold choices, innovation and imitation
therefore occur at YL and max fYF ; YLg respectively. If K  K := (D=M ) I the equilibrium
thresholds are fYL; YLg and involve clustering, whereas if K > (D=M ) I the equilibrium thresh-
olds are fYL; YF g and involve di¤usion.
3.2 E¢ cient imitation cost and IPR levels
We next examine e¢ ciency from the standpoint of the industry and of the regulator successively.
3.2.1 Industry optimum
As seen above, the level of the imitation cost determines the type of equilibrium outcome in the
industry. This cost in turn ultimately depends on technological conditions, but it can also be
a¤ected by such choices as ex-ante agreements regarding the pooling of resources or common
standards. It therefore makes sense to think of K as a decision variable in certain industries and
to inquire as to what level is optimal from the industrys perspective.
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Answering this question amounts to identifying the cost of imitation that maximizes industry
prot, i.e. to solving maxK2R+ [L (YL) + F (YL)]. Substituting equilibrium threshold values into
the payo¤s, equilibrium industry prot is
L (YL) + F (YL) =
I
   1

y
YL

  M   2D
r   
y
[YF ]
 1 .
With exogenous roles the innovators investment threshold YL is independent of K, whereas
increasing K raises the imitation threshold YF which has either a neutral e¤ect on industry prot
if 2D = M or a positive e¤ect if 2D < M . In this latter case the optimal imitation cost for
the industry is K = 1 and only rm 1 invests. In such an industry, one would not therefore
expect development expenses to be pooled or measures such as common standards to be adopted.
3.2.2 Social optimum
The imitation cost can also be a¤ected by policy variables and in particular by the level of IPR
protection chosen by regulators. We consider a second-best welfare benchmark, in which rms are
free to select their entry thresholds according to the predetermined investment sequence dened
above.
For given thresholds Y1 and Y2, social welfare is
SM + M
r    Y1   I

y
Y1

+

(SD + 2D)  (SM + M )
r    Y2  K

y
Y2

. (6)
Substituting for the equilibrium values of Y1 and Y2, the welfare second-best can be expressed as
the following function of the regulators instrument:
W (K) =
8><>:


 1
SD+2D
M
  1

I  K

y
YL

, K  K
 SMM + 1

I
 1

y
YL

+

 (SD+D) (SM+M )D + 1

K
 1

y
YF

, K > K.
W (K) is clearly decreasing for K  K. For K > K, its behavior depends the magnitude of the
second summand which is of the form AWK ( 1). The sign of the constant AW depends on the
sign of ( ((SD + D)  (SM + M )) =D)+1. If this latter term is positive, then social welfare is
globally decreasing and the socially optimal imitation cost is KW = 0. However in many oligopoly
models the private entry incentive is socially excessive because of the business-stealing e¤ect (see
Section 2.1), which implies that SD + D < SM + M . The constant AW is then negative if
 > D= ((SM + M )  (SD + D))( 1), in which case W (K) increases over (K;1). Even then
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however,
lim
K!1
W (K) =


SM
M
+ 1

I
   1

y
YL




   1
SD + 2D
M
  1

I

y
YL

=W (0),
with strict inequality if SD + 2D > SM + M , i.e. if the product market does not function
as a cartel with both rms active. We conclude that the socially optimal imitation cost level is
KW = 0 for all parameter values. As might be expected therefore, if the order of investments
is predetermined then while a monopoly is optimal for the industry the social optimum favors
competition and avoiding duplication of development expenditures.
To summarize these results,
Proposition 1 If the investment sequence is predetermined, investments are clustered at YL if
K  K and di¤used over YL and YF if K > K. Provided that entry raises product market output,
the e¢ cient imitation costs for the industry and for society are respectively K =1 and KW = 0.
4 Endogenous innovation and imitation
Suppose the roles of rms as innovator or imitator are not predetermined but instead result
from dynamic competition. A non-cooperative timing game therefore determines the sequence of
investments. Firms choose innovative investment thresholds that they can update as imitators in
a non-strategic continuation phase if rival innovation occurs. Industry dynamics typically consist
of a period of inaction before either rm has developed the product over which the strategic
interaction plays out, followed possibly by a monopoly phase and a duopoly phase once both
rms have developed their own variants of the product. The game is described in Section 4.1,
equilibrium in Section 4.2 and the e¤ect of imitation cost on equilibrium thresholds and payo¤s
is discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Firm strategies and payo¤s
The strategy of rm i, i = 1; 2, consists of a threshold Yi 2 [y;1] that triggers its investment
when reached for the rst time. Strategies are chosen at time zero to determine the stochastic
time at which each rm plans to invest, assumed to be a rst hitting time, and thus the timing
13
of innovation in the industry. Once innovation occurs any remaining rm revises its investment
threshold in the continuation phase which determines when imitation occurs.13
To describe the investment game the strategies Y1 and Y2 must be mapped into outcomes.
For Y1 6= Y2 this is straightforward, since one of the rms is the leader and obtains the payo¤
L (min fY1; Y2g) while the other is therefore the follower and obtains the payo¤ F (min fY1; Y2g).
For Y1 = Y2 however, taking the outcome to consist of simultaneous investments with payo¤s
M(Yi) for each rm does not correctly represent economic behavior if payo¤s satisfy L (Yi) 
F (Yi) > M (Yi), i = 1; 2, i.e. if both rms seek to invest whereas it would be optimal for only
one to do so. Such cases arise typically in preemption games, and in the discrete time mixed
strategy equilibrium that continuous time approximates, investments in fact turn out to be par-
tially coordinated. A standard solution in the literature is to have players use extended mixed
strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole [10], Thijssen et al. [26], see also Section B), but we follow an
alternative approach in this section for simplicity. This approach consists in positing a probabilis-
tic tie-breaking rule for such simultaneous investment attempts. This rule is calibrated to yield
payo¤s that are consistent with the symmetric equilibrium using extended mixed strategies, and
notably satisfy the same rent-dissipation property.
If Y1 = Y2 = Y we therefore assume that either rm innovates (leads in investment) with
probability14
p (Y ) =
(
F (Y ) M(Y )
L(Y )+F (Y ) 2M(Y ) , Y < Y
F and L (Y )  F (Y )
0, otherwise
(7)
and simultaneous investments accordingly occur with probability 1  2p (Y ).
With these assumptions the payo¤ of rm i is
V (Yi; Y i) =
8>><>>:
L (Yi) , Yi < Y i
p (Yi)L (Yi) + p (Yi)F (Yi) + (1  2p (Yi))M (Yi) , Yi = Y i
F (Y i) , Yi > Y i
(8)
and the normal form of the investment game is
(f1; 2g ; [y;1) [y;1) ; (V; V )) .
13This ability of rms to update their thresholds when rival investment occurs is the main di¤erence with Rein-
ganum [21]s technology adoption game with open-loop strategies in which rms remain committed to their initial
threshold choice as outcomes unfold.
14Observe that in the rst line the investment probability solves the condition pL (Y )+pF (Y )+(1  2p)M(Y ) =
F (Y ) so rms are indi¤erent between the expected payo¤ from investing at the threshold Y and the follower payo¤
from postponing investment.
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A Nash equilibrium of the investment game is a pair of strategies
bY1; bY2 such that V bYi; bY i 
V

Yi; bY i for all Yi  y, i 2 f1; 2g. In the next subsection, we describe the unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium, which can involve pure or mixed strategies, and establish the necessary for-
mal structure for the subsequent welfare results. Because by construction the payo¤ function
V (Yi; Y i) encapsulates outcomes of an equilibrium with extended mixed strategies, the equilib-
rium obtained in the static investment game of this section is consistent with the continuous time
games in closed-loop strategies in the literature. We verify this by studying a dynamic version of
the game in the appendix, which does not pose novel di¢ culties but is more notationally costly.
4.2 Equilibrium
The investment game has several Nash equilibria involving either pure or mixed strategies. We
assume that there are no coordinating mechanisms available, so that the rms, being symmetric
ex-ante, play the same strategies.15 Moreover, the resulting equilibrium leads to a compelling
relationship between industry outcomes and imitation cost. We therefore focus on the unique
symmetric equilibrium, consistently with Fudenberg and Tirole [10]s study of preemption and
with the discussion of attrition in Hendricks et al. [14].
To grasp the nature of the timing game for di¤erent levels of the imitation cost more easily,
the reader may refer again to Figures 1   4. For K  eK (Figure 1), the leader payo¤ L (Y ) lies
below the follower payo¤ F (Y ) for all Y  y. Innovating at any threshold Yi < YM is dominated
by innovating at YM , and from YS onward L (Y ) is decreasing so the investment game constitutes
a standard war of attrition. For eK < K < bK (Figure 2), the leader payo¤L (Y ) also lies below the
follower payo¤ F (Y ) for all Y  y. In this case however, YL is the global maximum of the leader
payo¤ and innovating at YM is dominated by thresholds in

YL; Y L

. Firms therefore engage
in a nonstandard war of attrition, with innovation thresholds continuously distributed over the
support

YL; Y L
 [ [YM ;1) where L (Y ) decreases. For bK < K < I (Figure 3), the leader payo¤
L (Y ) lies above the follower payo¤ F (Y ) for Y 2  YP ; Y P , where YP and Y P are the lower
and upper roots of the condition L (Y ) = F (YF ). There is therefore preemption over this range,
though rms engage in a war of attrition o¤ the equilibrium path if the threshold Y P is reached
and no rm has yet invested. Finally if I  K (Figure 4), the leader payo¤ L (Y ) lies above the
follower payo¤ F (Y ) for Y 2 (YP ; YF ), which corresponds to a standard preemption game.
15 In a similar model of investment with spillovers Hoppe [17] focuses on asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
under attrition. This analysis applies for instance if the rms have multimarket contact that allows investments to
be coordinated across markets.
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The innovation threshold that arises in symmetric equilibrium, YI := min
nbY1; bY2o, is de-
scribed in the next proposition. This threshold takes di¤erent values eYA, YP or YL depending
upon whether attrition or preemption occur (cases (i) and (ii)) or the imitation cost attains a
pivotal level bK at which neither preemption nor attrition occur (case (iii)) (see Section A.3 for
proof and derivation of eYA).
Proposition 2 In the symmetric equilibrium of the investment game,
(i) (attrition) if K < bK equilibrium is in mixed strategies with an innovation threshold eYA dis-
tributed continuously over [YM ;1) if K  eK and YL; Y L [ [YS ;1) if eK < K < bK;
(ii) (preemption) if K > bK equilibrium is in pure strategies and the innovation threshold is YP ;
(iii) if K = bK equilibrium is in pure strategies and the innovation threshold is YL.
Given the equilibrium threshold for innovation, the optimal follower behavior described in
Section 2.2 determines the imitation threshold. Imitation therefore occurs immediately in case
(i) if eYA  YM , or with a lag at YF in case (i) if eYA < YM and in cases (ii) and (iii).
The pivotal imitation cost level that separates attrition and preemption satises bK < I, so
a lower imitation cost is necessary but not su¢ cient for a second mover advantage to exist and
attrition to occur. Too see why, consider an industry in which K = I. In such an industry a
rst-mover that invests optimally earns additional monopoly prots until the market size process
hits YF . In order for a second-mover advantage to arise and rms to be willing to wait, the cost
of imitation must be su¢ ciently low to compensate the second mover for forgoing this monopoly
rent. In practice therefore a lower cost for imitators, which constitutes the most likely situation
absent IPRs, does not itself ensure that rms have a second-mover advantage or that they will
nd it desirable to pursue so-called imitation strategies.
Because the strategic interaction depends on the position of the imitation costK relative to bK,
the comparative statics of this threshold reveal the e¤ect that the main industry parameters, the
intensity of product market competition (M=D) and the characteristics of the demand process
( and ), have on the nature of the timing game.
Proposition 3 The more intense product market competition is and the lower are drift and
volatility, the more likely it is that preemption occurs, and conversely for attrition:
@ bK
@ (M=D)
< 0,
@ bK
@
;
@ bK
@
> 0.
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To provide intuition for the last inequality, recall that because of market uncertainty there
is an option value from waiting. So long as that there is an inherent advantage to imitation
(K < I), then for large enough levels of drift and volatility such that K < bK, this option
value outweighs any preemptive motive to secure monopoly rents. That is to say, an attrition
regime is more likely in industries with greater trend growth and demand volatility.16 This is an
important observation in our framework, because it identies a countervailing force to several
mechanisms that are highlighted in the rest of the paper. As the next sections show, rm choices
regarding technology or licensing and regulator choices of IPR levels generally make dynamic
competition more preemptive. One therefore expects attrition to occur relatively rarely, except
in those industries in which market uncertainty is signicant.
4.3 Imitation cost and industry outcomes
The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 involves several intuitive relationships between the
cost of imitation and the dynamic pattern of investments and rm protability which we describe
here successively.
4.3.1 Thresholds
From the expression of YF it directly follows that a higher imitation cost raises the standalone
duopoly threshold. However raising YF does not by itself imply that imitation is delayed in equi-
librium at least in an attrition regime, since innovation and hence imitation occur at a stochastic
threshold beyond YF with positive probability. The e¤ect of imitation cost on innovation and
innovation timing must therefore be studied more carefully.
To begin with, there is an inverse relationship between the cost of imitation and the innovation
threshold. Under preemption, it is straightforward to establish that @YP =@K < 0. Under attri-
16One example of real-world conditions that might t such a framework is the following. Pharmaceutical rms
face market conditions that impact product introductions and that can vary signicantly across geographic areas. In
low- and middle-income countries, economic and demographic drivers often imply high demand growth, but political
instability can also result in less demand predictability than in high-income economies, and thus discourage the
industry from introducing new treatments or preventives. Managers of big pharmaceutical companies are very aware
of such market characteristics, and emphasize that although pharmaceutical markets in key emerging economies,
such as China, India, and Brazil, are expanding at rates of more than 12 percent per year (...) uncertain demand,
and political and economic instability in some countries have deterred private investors for decades (Witty [29],
pp. 118 and 124).
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tion, the distribution of innovator entry thresholds is shifted leftward so the innovation thresholdeYA decreases stochastically.
The relationship between the cost of imitation and the imitation threshold, which is monotone
under preemption since @YF =@K > 0, is again more involved under attrition. Indeed in the waiting
game a higher imitation cost results in a higher imitation threshold if the innovation threshold
realization is low so that there is a positive lag between innovation and imitation (eYA  YF ).
However if the realization of the innovation threshold is high (eYA > YF ), imitation occurs right
after innovation, so its distribution is accordingly also shifted leftward by an increase in the cost
of imitation to the right of YF . Therefore a higher imitation cost delays imitation if innovation
occurs early, but indirectly hastens imitation if innovation occurs late. A better measure of the
speed of imitation is therefore the gap between innovation and imitation thresholds, which under
attrition is equal to max
n
YF ; eYAo  eYA and is nondecreasing in K.
In the model, changes in imitation cost therefore have a monotonic e¤ect on both the inno-
vation threshold and the imitation lag. An increase in imitation cost thus accelerates innovation
and delays the arrival of imitation conditional upon innovation having occurred.
4.3.2 Equilibrium payo¤s
There also exists a useful equilibrium relationship between imitation cost and industry perfor-
mance. Observe rst that because under attrition and preemption competition between rms to
secure second- or rst-mover advantage results in the dissipation of positional rents, equilibrium
rm values have straightforward expressions. In an attrition regime, the equilibrium rm value is
M (YM ) over
h
0; eKi, L (YL) over h eK; bKi and F (YF ) over h bK;1. Moreover viewed as functions
of the cost of imitation, M (YM ) is constant, L (YL) is increasing and F (YF ) is decreasing over
the interiors of the relevant ranges. Industry value is therefore nondecreasing in K up until bK
and decreasing thereafter, and we can conclude that it is at this level where neither attrition nor
preemption occur that industry value is maximized, as rms do not have an incentive to dissipate
resources by seeking a positional advantage of either sort.
Proposition 4 The expected industry value is min fF (YF ) ;max fL (YL) ;M (YM )gg. Viewed as
a function of K it is quasiconcave, constant over

0; eK and has a unique maximum at K = bK.
In economic terms, Proposition 4 establishes that starting from a zero imitation cost, rms
benet ex-ante from raising the xed cost of imitation above eK so as to shield an innovator
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with positive probability from instantaneous imitation. Moreover, and despite possibly wasteful
duplicative xed costs ex-post, raising imitation cost for the second rm even further to bK is
benecial for the industry when the endogenous timing of investments is accounted for.
Aside from providing an intuitive characterization of industry value, Proposition 4 is instru-
mental in the next section in establishing several of the welfare results.
5 Normative analysis
The previous section showed how the nature of the timing game (attrition or preemption) and
the dynamics of innovation and imitation are related to the cost of imitation. The social welfare
generated by the innovative and imitative products is therefore determined by regulatory choices
which a¤ect imitation cost. In this section, we seek to identify socially optimal levels of imitation
cost in a second-best framework where regulators set the cost of imitation while rms freely
determine the timing of their investments. At rst glance this question might seem to just
involve a classic trade-o¤ between the reward of innovation and the dynamic deadweight loss from
monopoly, since a higher imitation cost prima facie raises the optimal threshold for imitation.
However as seen in Section 4.3.1, imitation does not necessarily occur at an optimal threshold so
an increase in imitation cost has an ambiguous e¤ect on the timing of imitation in an attrition
regime, and the optimal imitation cost therefore needs to be studied more carefully.
For our welfare analysis, it is useful to express the social welfare function (6) in terms of
producer surplus and the consumer surpluses due to innovation and imitation. Its value in a free
entry equilibrium is
W (K) = 2min fF (YF ) ;max fL (YL) ; L (YM )gg
+
SMy

r    E
heYIi ( 1) + (SD   SM ) y
r    E
h
max
neYI ; YFoi ( 1) : (9)
The rst summand in (9) is expected industry value, which by Proposition 4 is constant for
K < eK and strictly quasiconcave with a maximum at bK. The second term is the expected
consumer surplus due to innovative investment. This term is monotonically increasing in K
since a higher imitation cost shifts the distribution of innovation thresholds leftward. The third
term is the expected consumer surplus due to the imitators entry whose relationship with K is
ambiguous under attrition, since it is the lag between innovation and imitation and not the timing
of imitation itself that increases monotonically with K.
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The function W (K) does not have a closed-form expression over its entire range. However
its value over
h
0; bKi has an intuitive bound and there is a semi-closed form over h bK,1 whose
maximum value we are able to calculate, so several properties of the social optimum can be derived
(See appendix for proofs of the following propositions and lemmas).
First, the socially optimal imitation cost has a positive lower bound:
Proposition 5 If the order of investments is endogenous, the socially optimal cost of imitation
satises KW  eK.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The rst term (producer surplus) in the
welfare function is constant over
h
0; eKi (Proposition 4) and the second term (consumer surplus
from innovation) is increasing since a higher imitation cost accelerates innovation, so only the
third term (consumer surplus from imitation) requires more careful consideration. However if
K  eK the innovation threshold is distributed over [YM ;1), and imitation occurs immediately
after innovation. Within this range an increase in imitation cost therefore actually accelerates
imitation indirectly, which unambiguously increases the consumer surplus from imitation.
It is therefore never optimal to set the cost of imitation at zero. Rather, it must be su¢ ciently
high so that an innovator expects a phase of monopoly prots with positive probability provided
that he innovates at a low enough threshold. Conversely a rm that winsthe timing game by
being more patient than its rival should accordingly pay a minimum price to develop its imitative
product, so that the industry avoids the Schererian dynamics described in the introduction. Even
if one adheres to the view that IPRs should be abolished altogether (Boldrin and Levine [2]), it
is nevertheless important to ascertain that the cost of imitation meets such a threshold.17
Second, the positive lower bound of the socially optimal imitation cost can be tightened
further if an intuitive condition is met and there is su¢ cient discounting. The next proposition
thus provides a rigorous foundation for strong IPRs based on their dynamic characteristics, under
17 In practice the lower bound eK can be used to assess initiatives like those in the pharmaceutical industry to
reduce the relative cost of imitation and encourage generic competition. In low- and middle-income countries, often
characterized by a rapidly expanding and highly uncertain demand which makes attrition more likely (Proposition
3), optimal social welfare in the local market may indeed involve low IPRs and attrition but in all cases requires
that a su¢ cient level of protection be maintained so that there remains a window of market sizes in which an
innovator entering su¢ ciently early is incentivized by a period of monopoly prots.
For example, in order to increase access to antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV infection in the developing world, over
the last decades political mobilization has facilitated the production of generic versions of the medicines patented
in developed countries (Hoen et al. [16]), which is consistent with our analysis above.
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the assumption that the static private entry incentive is socially excessive (D > (SD + 2D)  
(SM + M )) which characterizes many standard oligopoly models (see Section 2.1).
Proposition 6 If the order of investments is endogenous, the socially optimal cost of imitation
satises KW  bK provided that the static private entry incentive is socially excessive and  is
su¢ ciently large.
The proposition establishes that the drift and volatility of market size, through their e¤ect on
the discounting parameter , play a key role in identifying which type of dynamic competition
is socially optimal. Specically, it is in those industries for which drift and volatility are not
too large that IPR protection should be set su¢ ciently high for competition between rms to be
preemptive, whereas the issue of optimal IPR levels remains an open question if the drift and
volatility are signicant.18
The proposition is established by means of two lemmas.
Lemma 1 W (K) has a unique maximum over
h bK,1i and there exists 0 > 1 such that the
socially optimal innovation threshold is
Y WP =
(
1
1+ YL,  < 0
YNPV ,   0
, where  :=
1
1 +
SM
M

M
D
  1


2

+
SD SM
D
.
Although we do not have an expression for the socially optimal imitation cost itself, the lemma
gives an exact expression for the optimal innovation threshold if rms play a game of preemption
(even though preemption thresholds do not themselves have a closed form generally). This optimal
innovation threshold lies between the break-even threshold YNPV and the standalone monopoly
threshold YL, and since  is increasing in , when  is large enough the optimum is a corner
solution that involves setting an arbitrarily high imitation cost KW = 1. Imitation then never
occurs and instead rms race to enter in winner-take-all preemption, the timing of the monopoly
innovation having been driven to the competitive threshold by the threat of potential entry.
The exact form of the preemption threshold given in Lemma 1 allows the local maximum of
W (K) over
h bK,1i to be evaluated. There is no corresponding expression for the maximum value
18For instance for orphan drugs and rare disease development, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration enacted
an enhanced form of IPR protection (Orphan Drug Exclusivity) together with a tax credit that lowers the costs
of clinical trials (Grabowski et al. [12]). To the extent that such markets are characterized by low growth and
volatility, our analysis o¤ers theoretical support to such regulatory measures.
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of W (K) over
h
0; bKi, but if the static private entry incentive is socially excessive then the third
term in the welfare function has an intuitive bound involving the prots of the imitating rm,
and the values of social welfare over the two di¤erent ranges can be compared, establishing the
proposition.
Lemma 2 If the static private entry incentive is socially excessive, then KW  bK if
SM
M
 
 () , where 
 () := 3
2


 1
 1   1 .
The function 
 () is decreasing in  with lim!1 
 () = 0, so Lemma 2 establishes that
with su¢ cient discounting (i.e. su¢ ciently low drift and volatility) the optimal level of social
welfare lies in the range over which dynamic competition is preemptive.
The previous two lemmas provide su¢ cient conditions, both for high IPRs to be socially
optimal (SM=M  
 ()) and, provided that this is the case, for optimal IPRs to result in
winner-take-all preemption (  0).19 For several standard product market specications that
satisfy the excess static private entry incentive restriction in the proposition, these conditions are
straightforward to verify.
Example 1 (linear demand) Suppose that the product market is characterized by a linear inverse
demand P = A BQ, A;B > 0 and that rms have constant unit variable cost c. Then after nor-
malizing by (A  c)2 =B, product market outcomes are (SM ; SD; M ; D) = (1=8; 2=9; 1=4; 1=9).
Solving SM=M = 0:5 = 
 () numerically gives the threshold for KW  bK as   2:5692. With
these values, 0 is the upper root of 5
2   8   20 = 0 which gives 0  2:9541 as the threshold
for winner-take-all preemption.
Example 2 (isoelastic demand) Suppose that the product market is characterized by an isoelastic
inverse demand P = AQ 1=", A > 0; " > 1, and that rms have constant unit variable cost c.
Then product market outcomes satisfy SM=M = "= ("  1), SD=D = 4"= ("  1) and M=D =
4 (2 ("  1) = (2"  1))" 1. The threshold for the condition SM=M = "= ("  1) = 
 () to hold
for all " is   1:7201. With these values, 0 is the upper root of
2
 
4

2 ("  1)
2"  1
" 1
  1
!
  2  

3  2
"

= 0,
19 It is useful for the examples in the text to note that 0 is the upper root of
2
SM
M

M
D
  1

+ 

2
SM
M
  SD
D

  SM
M
  2 = 0
(see Section A.6).
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which gives
0 =
1 +
s
1 +
 
3  2"

4

2(" 1)
2" 1
" 1   1
4

2(" 1)
2" 1
" 1   1 .
This is an increasing function of ", with lim"!1 0 =

1 +
q
1 + 3
 
4e 1=2   1 =  4e 1=2   1 
2:3122, which therefore gives the threshold for winner-take-all preemption in the social optimum
for all ".
Further welfare results can be obtained in specic cases:
Proposition 7 If the order of investments is endogenous then
(i) if the consumer surplus from innovation is su¢ ciently small (SM  0), then eK < KW < bK;
(ii) if there is collusion in the product market (SD + 2D = SM + M ), then KW  bK.
Part (i) complements the previous results of the section by showing that there exist conditions
under which values of the imitation cost in the attrition range constitute a social optimum. This
is not obvious a priori since there is no closed form expression for W (K) over this range, but it
is nevertheless possible to show that lim
K! bK W 0(K) < 0. Intuitively, in this case the innovator
does not contribute measurably to the consumer surplus and producer surplus is locally insensitive
to imitation cost at bK. Therefore, decreasing imitation cost from bK incentivizes imitation and
improves welfare. Part (ii) reects the opposite situation, where imitator entry does not a¤ect
consumer surplus because of collusion in the product market. Then only innovation contributes to
social welfare, and the role of imitation cost is to incentivize innovation in a preemption regime.
We complete our analysis by comparing welfare levels with endogenous innovation with those
obtained in Section 3 where the investment sequence is predetermined. Consider a regulator who
can choose both whether rms compete dynamically and the level of imitation cost. This situation
might arise, for example, if a regulator seeks to accelerate innovation in a particular market by
contracting with one rm directly. A regulator then sets the optimal imitation cost, which is
KW = 0 if rm roles are predetermined and KW > bK if roles are endogenous and  is su¢ ciently
large. Because we can evaluate the innovation threshold and the optimal welfare level in this
case (Lemma 1), it is possible to compare both situations. The upshot is that fostering dynamic
competition to innovate rst is a valuable policy instrument in such industries, and can be shown
to result in a higher level of welfare:
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Proposition 8 If product market competition is su¢ ciently intense, the welfare optimum with
endogenous innovation under the conditions of Proposition 6 is greater than with predetermined
roles.
Observe moreover that the optimal imitation cost levels di¤er signicantly depending upon
whether rm roles are predetermined or endogenous. This is particularly relevant because the
patent design literature generally takes the value of innovation as given and does not endogenize
its timing,20 which results in a starkly di¤erent conclusion and a suboptimal prescription regard-
ing imitation cost, illustrating the importance of accounting for industry dynamics rather than
relying on static competition in the product market.
6 Extensions
In this section, we discuss how some other aspects of innovation and imitation t into our model.
One of these is the ability of an innovating rm to raise the imitators entry barrier by making
its product more costly to reverse engineer or by strengthening its patentability. Another is con-
tracting between the innovator and the imitator, which can consist in a buyout of the rival rm
or a technology transfer. From a formal standpoint these di¤erent extensions add an intermediate
decision to the investment game during the monopoly phase, either at the moment of the innova-
tors entry or when the imitator invests. By raising the value of innovating, these extensions favor
rst-mover advantage and the emergence of preemption regimes, with contrasting implications
for imitation timing and welfare.
6.1 Endogenous imitation cost
Suppose that the innovating rm may a¤ect the cost of imitation by varying the amount of
either technical or legal protection. In case of technical protection, the cost of reverse engineering
can be raised by increasing product complexity. For example an innovating rm can render
its product more di¢ cult to disassemble, or even add misleading complexity (Samuelson and
Scotchmer [23]). In the case of legal protection, wider patents imply higher costs for inventing
20Admittedly with either perfect competition or monopoly instead of duopoly, the timing of innovation follows
a straightforward investment rule. As Rockett [22] observes, accordingly most [models] take the identity of the
innovator as given.Denicolò [5] is an exception, but his patent race model does not allow for attrition and second-
mover advantage.
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around to develop a non-infringing imitation, and rms may decide to pursue patent protection
more or less aggressively (Encaoua et al. [8]).
Such choices are incorporated into the model by supposing that when it invests at threshold
Yi, an innovating rm chooses how much additional cost, , to incur in order to raise the imitation
cost by an amount f ().21 The imitation cost increase is instantaneous and the function f is
taken to be twice di¤erentiable, increasing and concave with f(0) = 0 and lim!0 f 0() =1. The
xed costs of the innovator and imitator are accordingly I () := I +  and K () := K + f ()
where I and K represent baseline values where no cost-raising expenditure is undertaken.
Proceeding by backward induction, the cost-raising e¤ort a¤ects the imitator payo¤ F (Y )
and standalone threshold YF through K(). At the moment of innovation therefore, an innovator
entering at the threshold Yi faces the decision problem
max
2R+
LE (Yi; ) :=

M
r   Yi   I   

y
Yi

  M   D
r   
y
[max fYi; YF ()g] 1
.
Let  (Yi) denote the solution to this problem. At an interior solution, YF () > Yi and 
satises


M
D
  1

f 0 () =

YF (
)
Yi

.
A straightforward comparative static argument establishes that the optimal cost-raising e¤ort is
increasing in the investment threshold and decreasing in the baseline imitation cost.22
To proceed further we focus on the situation where K  bK so the dynamic competition is
preemptive.23 Allowing the cost of imitation to be endogenous results in a higher leader payo¤
LE (Y; 
 (Y )) and a lower follower payo¤FE (Y;  (Y )) = F (Y )jK=K+(Y ) than when this cost is
exogenous. This makes the investment game even more preemptive. Since equilibrium payo¤s are
pegged to the follower value under preemption, rms have a lower expected value in equilibrium.
To avoid this penalizing outcome rms would prefer to both commit ex-ante not to exert any cost-
raising e¤ort if they innovate. One way to achieve such a commitment is by agreeing to an open
21See Huisman and Kort [18] for a model of preemption with rms competing on both the timing and magnitude
of investment.
22The latter property is in line with the situation of biopharmaceutical rms (see footnote 6 above) where greater
reliance is placed on patenting in the medications segment in which natural entry barriers are low than in the
vaccines segment.
23This restriction relates specically to optimal stopping and is not necessary for the economic analysis. For high
values of the innovation threshold Yi, corner solutions  = 0 arise that result in a kink of LE. In such cases the
threshold strategies rms are assumed to use neednt be optimal investment policies. Under preemption however
such thresholds occur only o¤ the equilibrium path.
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or common technological standard, a measure which is not desirable if roles are predetermined
(Proposition 1).
Proposition 9 If the cost of imitation is endogenous and the baseline investment game is pre-
emptive rms benet from agreeing ex-ante to a common standard.
6.2 Takeover and licensing
Contracts ranging from acquisitions and pay-for-delay agreements to joint ventures and licensing
contracts typically play an important role in innovation decisions. These arrangements have
contrasting e¤ects on investment incentives that can be incorporated into our model. Assume
that rms can contract once to transfer either productive assets or technology in exchange for a
lump sum transfer, ', from the innovator rm to the imitator, and that the contract is written
by the innovator who holds all the bargaining power.
Because of the e¢ ciency e¤ect (M > 2D) it is protable for an innovator to pay its rival
not to subsequently enter the market if it can, by taking over its assets or engaging in some
equivalent measures.24 Proceeding by backward induction, in the continuation phase that begins
when innovation occurs at a threshold Yi, the remaining rms expected payo¤ is F (Yi). This
continuation payo¤ constitutes a participation constraint in any contract that the innovator o¤ers.
The innovating rm therefore o¤ers a transfer ' (Yi) =VD (Yi) at the moment when it invests.
The leader payo¤ with takeovers is therefore
LT (Y ) :=

M
r   Y   I
 y
Y
   F (Y ) .
The e¤ect on the investment game is straightforward. The follower payo¤ is unchanged
whereas the leader payo¤ is larger than without buyouts, rendering preemption more likely. All
else equal the e¤ect of the takeover option on the leader payo¤ depends on the strength of the
e¢ ciency e¤ect, and if it is su¢ ciently strong or in industries with su¢ ciently high demand growth
or volatility (if M=D   + 1) attrition does not occur for any level of K.
Whether the possibility of takeovers runs in the interest of the industry or not depends on the
cost of imitation. Under preemption expected prots are pegged to the follower value and therefore
una¤ected by takeovers, whereas if K < bK, the industry functions naturally under attrition and
24 In the pharmaceutical industry pay-for-delay agreements can arise, generally in the context of a patent infringe-
ment suit brought by a brand-name company against a generic producer that challenges the innovators IPRs (see
Danzon [4]).
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rm values are pegged to the leader value. Industry prot then increases if takeovers are allowed,
so one would expect an active market for acquisitions to develop in such industries, and all the
more so if demand growth and volatility are high.
If a takeover is not possible an innovator must contend with follower entry but can recoup
revenue from the imitators investment through a license fee. Suppose that K = K +KI where
K is an incompressible level of imitation cost reecting such items as distribution and marketing
expenses and KI denotes the part of the product development cost that can be eliminated by a
technology transfer. Because licensing does not allow the innovator to push back the moment of
imitation, the optimal policy is to set the maximum license fee consistent with the participation
constraint at the moment of imitation, ' =  KI .
Proceeding by backward induction, the expected revenue from licensing adds a positive term
to the leader payo¤ which becomes
LL (Y ) :=

M
r   Y   I
 y
Y
   M   D
r    max fY; YF g  KI

y
max fY; YF g

.
As the leader payo¤ shifts up to the left of YF while leaving the follower payo¤ function unchanged,
the investment game is more preemptive with licensing than with takeovers. However whereas the
welfare consequences of takeovers are ambiguous (rms weakly benet and the consumer surplus
from innovation increases because product innovation occurs earlier, but the consumer surplus
from imitation is eliminated), the welfare consequences of licensing are unambiguously positive.
The visible e¤ect of licensing is the reduction in the duplication of R&D e¤orts as in Gallini [11],
and an additional indirect benet stems from the acceleration of innovation which raises consumer
surplus.
Thus,
Proposition 10 With contracting between the innovator and the imitator (i) takeovers are the
preferred instrument of an innovator and raise industry prot if K < bK whereas (ii) licensing is
Pareto-improving.
7 Conclusion
We have sought to model the dynamic allocation of resources to innovation and imitation, ex-
plicitly incorporating the interrelated investment decisions under uncertainty of imperfectly com-
petitive rms. As compared with the classic literature on innovation and patents, endogenizing
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the time at which innovation and imitation occur allows us to highlight a novel policy channel, in
which IPR levels act upon welfare through their e¤ect on dynamic competition.
The main message that emerges from our analysis is a broadly familiar one, insofar as we nd
that IPRs must be important enough to provide a su¢ cient incentive for innovation. By integrat-
ing the theory of investment under uncertainty into the analysis of innovation incentives, we are
able to sharpen this general perspective by pinpointing the role of specic market characteristics
which act as key determinants of investment, and thus to provide a grounding for strong IPRs
in circumstances that seem most likely to be present in mature industries. In such industries
we then nd that the barriers to imitation should be su¢ ciently high so as to render dynamic
competition between rms preemptive, and if discounting is important enough competition should
take the form of a winner-take-all contest. Moreover, a regulator who would attempt to accelerate
innovation by contracting with one rm directly would lose out on the social benets of dynamic
competition, as the welfare achieved with optimal IPRs is lower with predetermined roles than
with endogenous innovation.
In those industries in which growth and volatility are relatively high on the other hand, which
are those most typically associated with vibrant innovation, attrition may be e¤ective in ensuring
that additional benets of imitation resulting from greater product market competition do not
arrive excessively late. Even then some degree of IPR protection can be needed if the cost of
imitation is extremely low, in order to ensure that a rm that develops an imitative product as
the winner of the attrition game nevertheless pays a high enough entry cost so an industry does
not become mired in ine¢ cient dynamics.
In practice, antitrust and industrial policy decisions commonly focus on static product mar-
ket characteristics. The demand characteristics that we have highlighted, demand growth and
volatility, play at least as signicant a role in determining the investment incentives and prod-
uct development decisions, and as such should naturally underlie any determination of optimal
IPRs. As we have argued throughout in the footnotes, the policy measures taken in at least
one emblematic innovation-intensive industry seem to have been broadly consistent with such an
analysis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Duopoly option value VD
Once the rival rm has invested at the market size threshold Y any remaining rm holds a
standard growth option (Dixit and Pindyck [6]) whose value is obtained by solving the optimal
stopping problem
VD (Y ) = sup
t
EY
0@ 1Z

DYse
 rsds Ke r
1A .
From the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, the value function VD(Y ) satises
rVD (Y ) dt = EY dVD (Y )
and expanding the right-hand side using Itôs lemma yields the ordinary di¤erential equation that
VD(Y ) solves in the continuation region,
rVD = Y V
0
D +
1
2
2Y 2V 00D,
along with the boundary and smooth pasting conditions
VD (0) = 0
VD (YF ) =
D
r   YF  K
V 0D (YF ) =
D
r    .
The function A1Y 1 + A2Y 2 is a candidate solution. The associated fundamental quadratic is
0:52 (   1) +   r = 0 which has two roots of which only
 =
1
2
  
2
+
s
1
2
  
2
2
+
2r
2
is positive. Setting A2 = 0 to satisfy the rst boundary condition, it follows from the other
conditions that
YF =

   1
r   
D
K
and that A1 is (D=( (r   ))) [YF ] ( 1) which yields the expression for AD in the text.
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A.2 Leader, follower and simultaneous investment payo¤ functions
A.2.1 Derivation of F;L and M
The expression for the follower payo¤ (3) is simply the discounted value of VD (Y ). The expression
(4) is obtained from the denition of L (Y ) by:
Ey
"Z (maxfY;YF g)
(Y )
MYse
 rsds  e r(Y )I +
Z 1
(maxfY;YF g)
DYse
 rsds
#
= Ey
"Z 1
(Y )
MYse
 rsds  e r(Y )I  
Z 1
(maxfY;YF g)
(M   D)Yse rsds
#
=

M
r   Y   I
 y
Y
   M   D
r   
y
[max fY; YF g] 1
.
Finally the derivation of the simultaneous payo¤ (5) is similar to (4), noting that the ow prot
upon investment is D instead of M and that there is no follow-on entry so the second integral
dropped altogether.
A.2.2 Behavior of F;L and M
The most straightforward continuation payo¤s to study are M and F , so we start with these
before turning to L.
First, M (Y ) = ((D= (r   ))Y   I) (y=Y ) is quasiconcave in Y over (y;1) with a maxi-
mum at YM := ( (r   ) I) = ((   1)D) such that YM > y given the assumption Y0  YNPV ,
and limY!1M (Y ) = 0. Observe that M (Y ) is independent of K.
Next, consider the follower payo¤ F . If K < ((   1)Dy) = ( (r   )), then YF < y and F
is a strictly decreasing function of Y over [y;1) whereas if K  ((   1)Dy) = ( (r   )) then
F is constant over [y; YF ] and decreasing over (YF ;1), with limY!1 F (Y ) = 0. An increase in
K has two e¤ects on F (Y ): rst YF increases so the range of values over which the graph of F is
horizontal weakly increases, and second the value of F (Y ) decreases for all K so the entire graph
is shifted downward.
The comparison ofM (Y ) and F (Y ) is straightforward: YM < (>)YF if and only if I < (>)K
and if K < I thenM (Y ) < F (Y ) for all Y whereas if K > I thenM (Y ) > F (Y ) over a half-line
(YM ;1) where YM 2 (y; YM ).
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Finally, the leader payo¤L (Y ) is generally dened in parts according to whether Y is greater
or smaller than YF . If K < ((   1)Dy) = ( (r   )), necessarily YF < Y so that L (Y ) =M (Y )
whereas if K  ((   1)Dy) = ( (r   )) then
L (Y ) =
8<:

M
r Y   I
   y
Y
   M Dr  YF  yYF  , Y < YF
M (Y ) , Y  YF .
L is therefore continuous with a possible kink at YF . The rst part of L is quasiconcave in Y with
a maximum at YL := ( (r   ) I) = ((   1)M ) such that YL > y given the assumption on Y0.
An increase in K has two e¤ects on L (Y ): rst YF increases which reduces the range over
which the graphs of L and M overlap, and second the value of L over its rst part increases by
a constant inducing a parallel shift upward in the graph of L. Because M > D, YL < YM for
all K whereas YL < (>)YF if and only if I < (>) (M=D)K. Given the ranking of YM and YF
discussed above it follows that whenever K  I, L has two local maxima, YL and YM . It is shown
in the next subsection that there exists a critical threshold eK < I such that YL (YM ) is the global
maximum of L if and only if K > eK (K < eK).
The relationship between L and M is straightforward, as L is greater than M over (y; YF )
and the two functions coincide over [YF ;1). To compare L and F rst note that for su¢ ciently
low values of K, L < F for all Y , but otherwise the two functions can intersect. It is also shown
in the next subsection that there exists a critical threshold bK < I at which i) YL is a global
maximum of L and ii) both L and F attain the same maximum value at YL and YF respectively.
Above this threshold, direct calculations establish that either K < I in which case F > L over
an interval
 
Y P ; Y F
  (y; YF ) or K  I in which case L  F for all Y .
A.2.3 Critical thresholds eK and bK
The threshold eK solves L (YL) = M (YM ). If it were the case that eK < (D=M )I so that
max fYL; YF g = YL, then after substitution L (YL) = ((D= (r   ))YL   I) (y=YL) =M (YL) <
M (YM ) since YM is the unique global maximizer of M . Hence it must be that eK  (D=M )I,
and therefore satises

M
r   YL   I

y
YL

  M   D
r    YF

y
YF

=

D
r   YS   I

y
YS

.
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Multiplying both sides by (YF =y)
 (note that YF =YL = (M=D)
 eK=I and YF =YM = eK=I
here) and substituting for remaining YL; YF and YM terms yields
1
   1

M
D
 h eKi
I 1
+

   1

1  M
D
 eK = 1
   1
h eKi
I 1
,
which has a unique positive solution,
eK =
0B@

M
D
  1


M
D
   1
1CA
1
 1
I.
The threshold bK solves L (YL) = F (YL). If it were the case that K  eK then as shown above
L (YL)  M (YM ) would hold, whereas M (YM ) < F (YL). Hence it must be that bK > eK and
max fYL; YF g = YF . The threshold bK therefore solves

M
r   YL   I

y
YL

  M   D
r    YF

y
YF

=
y
 [YF ]
( 1) .
Multiplying both sides by (YF =y)
 (note that here YF =YL = (M=D)
 bK=I) and substituting
for remaining YL and YF terms yields
I
   1

M
D
 h bKi
I 1
+

   1

1  M
D
 bK = bK
   1 .
which has a unique positive solution,
bK =
0B@1 + 

M
D
  1


M
D

1CA
1
 1
I. (11)
A.3 Proposition 2 (endogenous investment symmetric equilibrium)
A.3.1 Part (i)
There are two subcases for this part, K  eK and eK < K < bK (see Figures 1 and 2).
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K  eK subcase This is a standard war of attrition (in thresholds) over (YM ;1). Therefore
provided that rms do not move with positive probability in [y; YM ] the equilibrium distribution
follows from the argument in Hendricks et al. [14]. In a nondegenerate (and symmetric) mixed
strategy equilibrium, rms randomize investment triggers continuously over [YM ;1). To derive
the equilibrium distribution assume that rm j 6= i randomizes her investment trigger at t = 0
according to a cumulative distribution function G. Firm is expected payo¤ from investing at a
threshold Yi  YM isZ 1
YM
V (Yi; s)g(s)ds =
Z Yi
YM
F (s)g(s)ds+ (1 G(Yi))M(Yi).
Firm i will randomize if @
R1
YM
V (Yi; s)g(s)ds

=@Yi = 0 over the support, that is if G satises
[F (Y ) M(Y )] g (Y ) =  M 0(Y ) [1 G (Y )] for all Y 2 (YM ;1). As the same condition holds
for rm  i, the equilibrium distribution for each rm is
G (Y ) = 1  exp
Z Y
YS
M 0(s)
F (s) M(s)ds
and substituting for F and M gives
G (Y ) =
8<: 0, Y < YM1   YYM  II K e  II K  YYM  1, Y  YM .
Then, the distribution of the equilibrium innovation threshold for the industry, eYA, is just that
of the minimum of the rm thresholds, GA(Y ) = 1  (1 G (Y ))2.
It is claimed in the text (Section 4.3.1) that an increase in imitation cost accelerates innovation.
As for Y > YM
@G
@K
=

Y
YM
 I
I K
e
  I
I K

Y
YM
 1


I
(I  K)2

Y
YM
  1  ln Y
YM

> 0
(the last bracketed term is positive by the logarithm inequality), the distribution of each rms
innovation threshold (and therefore of their minimum eYA) is shifted leftward by an increase in
imitation cost.
eK < K < bK subcase This is also a war of attrition but since L (Y ) is decreasing over (YL; YF ),
increasing over (YF ; YM ) and decreasing over (YM ;1) its form is nonstandard. To identify the
support of the mixed strategies, observe that any Yi 2 (y; YL) is a strictly dominated strategy and
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no player puts positive probability on YL in a symmetric equilibrium. Similarly any Yi 2
 
Y L; YM

is strictly dominated by YM , and no player puts positive probability on YM in a symmetric
equilibrium. Investment thresholds are therefore continuously distributed over

YLY L
[ [YM ;1).
Letting G denote the equilibrium distribution, assume that rm j 6= i randomizes her
investment trigger. Firm i randomizes if @
R1
YS
V (Yi; s)g(s)ds

=@Yi = 0 over the support,
that is if G satises [F (Y )  L(Y )] g (Yi) =  L0(Y ) [1 G (Y )] for all Y 2
 
YL; Y L

and
[F (Y ) M(Y )] g (Y ) =  M 0(Y ) [1 G (Y )] for all Y 2 (YM ;1). The former condition holds
for
G0 (Y ) = 1  exp
Z Y
YL
L0(s)
F (YF )  L(s)ds
=
L (YL)  L (Y )
F (YF )  L (Y )
while the latter condition is satised by G so that the equilibrium distribution is
G (Y ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0, Y < YL
G0 (Y ) , YL  Y  Y L
G0
 
Y L

, Y L < Y < YM
G0
 
Y L

+
 
1 G0
 
Y L

G (Y ) , Y  YM .
To establish that an increase in imitation cost accelerates innovation as claimed in the text, observe
that L (YL) L (Y ) is independent of K while F (YF ) L (Y ) is decreasing in K so @G0=@K > 0
and that @Y L=@K > 0 so that, given that @G=@K > 0 as seen above, @G=@K > 0 over the
relevant range.
A.3.2 Part (ii)
There are two subcases for this part, bK < K < I and K  I (see Figures 3 and 4). It is simpler
to begin with the subcase K  I which is standard.
K  I subcase For K  I, L (YF )  F (YF ) so there exists a unique YP < YF such that
L (YP ) = F (YF ). The preemption range is (YP ; YF ), and in this range rms seek to innovate
before their rival for any Y i 2 (YP ; YF ). In equilibrium both rms set Yi = YP which by the
tie-breaking rule results in either rm innovating at YP with equal probability.
As joint investment equilibria also arise in preemption models, it must be veried that this
is not the case here. Investment at the optimal simultaneous investment threshold YM by both
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rms results in a payo¤M (YM ) whereas for K  I (for K > eK in fact), L (YL) > M (YM ), so
joint investment cannot be an equilibrium.
bK < K < I subcase For bK < K < I, the condition L (Y ) = F (Y ) has two roots YP ; Y P
with YP < YL and Y P 2 (YL; YF ). For a given Y > Y P , L (Y )  F (YF ) so playing beyond the
preemption range
 
YP ; Y P

is a dominated strategy. Over the preemption range
 
YP ; Y P

rms
preempt one another as in the previous subcase and in equilibrium both rms invest at YP , which
by the tie-breaking rule (7) results in either rm investing at YP with equal probability.
A.3.3 Part (iii)
If K = bK, then L (YL) = F (YF ) and the only symmetric equilibrium is (YL; YL).
A.4 Proposition 3 (comparative statics of bK)
For the comparative statics in (M=D) evaluating the relevant partial derivatives and rearranging
yields
@ bK
@ (M=D)
=  
M
D
  1
M
D

1 + 

M
D
  1
 bK
so @ bK=@ (M=D) < 0 directly, whereas for the comparative statics in 
@ bK
@
=
0BBBB@ 
ln
 
1+

M
D
 1


M
D

!
   1 +

M
D
  1

M
D
   1 +  MD   1MD  ln MD

M
D


1 + 

M
D
  1

M
D
2
1CCCCA
bK
   1
=   1
(   1)2
0@ln
0@1 + 

M
D
  1

M
D
1A  (   1)

M
D
  1

1 + 

M
D
  1

1A bK.
The sign of @ bK=@ is the opposite of that of the (bracketed) middle term. Applying the logarithm
inequality lnx > (x  1) =x for x > 0; x 6= 1 with x = (1 +  ((M=D)  1)) = (M=D) yields
ln
0@1 + 

M
D
  1

M
D
1A > (   1)

M
D
  1

1 + 

M
D
  1

so @ bK=@ < 0 and hence @ bK=@; @ bK=@ > 0.
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A.5 Proposition 5 (KW  eK)
If K < eK, rms randomize investment triggers over [YM ;1) according to the distribution G (Y )
and imitator entry is immediate. As discussed in the text, producer surplus is constant overh
0; eKi, whereas since eYA is stochastically decreasing in K (see Section A.3) consumer surplus
from both innovation and imitation is increasing in K over this range.
A.6 Lemma 1 (characterization of Y WP )
Suppose K > bK so in equilibrium the innovation threshold is YP 2 [YNPV ; YL) and imitation
occurs at YF . The social welfare function (9) is
W (K) =

M + SM
r    YP   I

y
YP

+

(2D + SD)  (M + SM )
r    YF  K

y
YF

=

M + SM
r    YP   I

y
YP

+



SD   (M + SM )
D

+  + 1

Dy
 (r   )

y
YF
 1
and the value W ( bK) results by continuity since lim
K! bK YP = YL.
A preliminary step is to obtain an expression for dYP =dK which is used subsequently in the
computation of W 0(K). Recall that YP is dened implicitly by the condition L (YP ) = F (YF ).
Dividing this identity by y and grouping the YP and YF terms yields a more compact form,
M
r   
1
[YP ]
 1  
I
[YP ]

=
M
r   
1
[YF ]
 1  
K
[YF ]

=

M
r     
   1

D
r   

1
[YF ]
 1 .
Observe that [YP ]
  =
h
M
r YF  K

=

M
r YP   I
i
[YF ]
 . The above condition has the form
f (YP ) = g (K), so dYP =dK = g0(K)=f 0(YP ) with
f 0 (YP ) =   (   1) M
r   
1
[YP ]

+ 
I
[YP ]
+1
= (   1) M
r   
YL   YP
[YP ]
+1
> 0
and
g0 (K) =     1
YF
dYF
dK
g (K) < 0.
Substituting g(K) = f (YP ) into g0(K) and then developing yields
dYP
dK
=     1
K
f (YP )
f 0(YP )
=  r   
M
M
r YP   I
YL   YP
YP
K
.
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Evaluating W 0(K) gives
W 0 (K) =

  (   1) SM + M
r    YP + I

y
[YP ]
+1
dYP
dK
 



SD   (M + SM )
D

+  + 1

y
YF

.
Substitute the expression for dYP =dK above to get
W 0 (K) =

  (   1) SM + M
r    YP + I

 r   
M
M
r YP   I
YL   YP
1
K

y
YP

 



SD   (M + SM )
D

+  + 1

y
YF

.
Substituting for [YP ]
  in the rst term, rearranging, and factoring (y=YF ) yields
W 0 (K) =

(   1)

SM
M
+ 1

YP   YL
 M
r YF  K
YL   YP
1
K
 



SD   (M + SM )
D

+  + 1

y
YF

=
 
(   1)

SM
M
+ 1

(YP   YL) + SM
M
YL
 
 1
M
D
  1
YL   YP
 



SD   (M + SM )
D

+  + 1

y
YF

=

 

SM
M
+ 1


M
D
  (   1)

+
SM
M


M
D
  (   1)

YL
YL   YP
 



SD   (M + SM )
D

+  + 1

y
YF

.
Regrouping the constant (non-Y ) terms gives
 

SM
M
+ 1


M
D
  (   1)

 



SD   (M + SM )
D

+  + 1

= (   1) SM
M
  SD
D
  2.
Therefore
W 0 (K) =


SM
D
  (   1) SM
M

YL
YL   YP + (   1)
SM
M
  SD
D
  2

y
YF

.
Since  (SM=D) > (   1) (SM=M ) and limK! bK YP = YL, limK! bKW 0(K) = +1. More-
over YL= (YL   YP ) and y=YF are both decreasing functions of K, so W 0 is decreasing over bK;1. Provided that limK!1W 0(K) < 0 therefore, the rst-order condition has a unique
root in
 bK;1.
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Since limK!1 YP = (r   ) I=M = ((   1) =)YL, the sign of limK!1W 0(K) is the same
as that of



SM
D
  (   1) SM
M

+ (   1) SM
M
  SD
D
  2
= 2
SM
D
  (   1)2 SM
M
  SD
D
  2.
Taken as a function of , this is a quadratic (), with (1) = (SM   SD   2D) =D < 0 and
lim!1() = 1. Therefore there exists a unique 0 > 1 such that (0) = 0. It follows
that the constrained optimization problem max
K bKW (K) has a unique optimum, which is nite
(interior) if  < 0 and innite otherwise. Provided that  < 0, the rst-order condition then
yields the expression for Y WP given in the proposition.
A.7 Lemma 2 (condition for KW  bK)
The lemma is established by rst deriving an upper bound of W over
h
0; bK (attrition) and then
comparing this bound with the maximum value over
h bK;1i.
Under attrition, expected social welfare (9) can be expressed
W (K) = E
"
SM + M
r   
eYA   I yeYA
#
+ E
264(SD + 2D)  (SM + M )
r    max
neYA; YFo K
0@ y
max
neYA; YFo
1A
375 .
The rst integrand is a quasiconcave function of investment threshold with a maximum at
( (r   ) I) =((  1)(SM + M ))  YL  eYA, which therefore is decreasing over (YL;1). There-
fore
E
"
SM + M
r   
eYA   I yeYA
#


SM + M
r    YL   I

y
YL




SM
M
+ 1

I
   1

y
YL

. (14)
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The bound on the second summand uses the assumption that the static entry incentive is excessive,
E
264(SD + 2D)  (SM + M )
r    max
neYA; YFo K
0@ y
max
neYA; YFo
1A
375
 E
264 D
r    max
neYA; YFo K
0@ y
max
neYA; YFo
1A
375 .
The term on the right-hand side is the equilibrium expected payo¤of a follower, E
h
F

max
neYA; YFoi,
that rm i obtains by setting Yi =1. Equilibrium payo¤s are constant over the support of mixed
strategies, so E
h
F

max
neYA; YFoi = max fL (YL) ; L (YS)g. This last term is maximized for
K = bK, by Proposition 4. Therefore
E
264(SD + 2D)  (SM + M )
r    max
neYA; YFo K
0@ y
max
neYA; YFo
1A
375  bK
   1

ybYF

where bYF :=  (r   ) bK =((   1)D)) =  bK=I (M=D)YL. Using (11) to substitute for bK=I ( 1) gives
E
"
(SD + 2D)  (SM + M )
r   
eYF  K yeYF
#
 1
1 + 

M
D
  1
 I
   1

y
YL

(15)
<
0:5I
   1

y
YL

. (16)
Combining (14) and (15) yields
max
K2[0; bK)W (K) <


SM
M
+ 1:5

I
   1

y
YL

(we seek an analytically tractable bound rather than the tightest bound here).
Over
h bK;1i, social welfare can be evaluated exactly, yielding25
max
K2[ bK;1]W (K) =
8><>:
SM
M
(1+ )
 
I
 1

y
YL

,  < 0

 1

SM
M
I

y
YL

,   0
(17)
25Derivation is available from the authors.
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where  is given in Lemma 1. By revealed preference, the optimal welfare level is at least as large
as if the regulator sets an innite cost of imitation, so
max
K2[ bK;1]W (K) 


   1
 SM
M
I

y
YL

.
A su¢ cient condition for max
K2[0; bK)W (K) < maxK2[ bK;1]W (K) is therefore

   1
 SM
M
I

y
YL

>


SM
M
+ 1:5

I
   1

y
YL

.
Cancelling common terms and rearranging yields 

   1
 1
  1
!
SM
M
>
3
2
which establishes the condition in the text.
A.8 Proposition 7 (specic welfare cases)
For part (i), we consider the limiting case SM = 0 (assuming that SD > 0) and then use the
continuity of W (K). From the expression of W (K) (9), only producer surplus and the consumer
surplus from imitation matter in this case. Both of these are decreasing in K over
 bK;1i
so any maximum of K must lie in
 eK; bKi (the lower bound is the one given by Proposition 5).
Moreover, since producer surplus is maximized at bK (Proposition 4), the sign of the left derivative
of welfare at bK, lim
K! bK W 0(K), depends only on the consumer surplus from imitation. Given
the innovation threshold under attrition eYA = minneY1; eY2o, this term is
(SD   SM ) y
r    E
1h
max
neYA; YFoi( 1) =
(SD   SM ) y
r   
0B@ 1
[YF ]
( 1) Pr
neYA  YFo+ EeYA>YF 1heYAi( 1)
1CA
=
(SD   SM ) y
(r   ) [YF ]( 1)
 
GA
 
Y L

+
Z 1
YM

YF
s
 1
dGA(s)
!
where GA = 1  (1 G (Y ))2 denotes the equilibrium distribution of eYA. Since G  Y LK= bK =
1, GA
 
Y L

K= bK = 1 and the right hand term vanishes at bK (note that dGA=dY = 2 (1 G) (dG=dY )).
Therefore at bK only the direct e¤ect @YF =@K remains, hence
lim
K! bK W 0(K) =  (   1)
SD   SM
r   

y
YF
 @YF
@K
 0
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with strict inequality if SD > SM . For SM = 0 therefore, limK! bK W 0(K) < 0 so the maximum
of W lies in
 eK; bK.
The argument for part (ii) is straightforward. From the expression ofW (K) (9), only producer
surplus and the consumer surplus from innovation matter in this case. The rst of these is weakly
increasing in K over
h
0; bKi and the second is increasing over R+, so the maximum of W (K) lies
in
 bK;1i.
A.9 Proposition 8 (predetermined sequence vs. endogenous innovation wel-
fare)
The social welfare assuming predetermined rm roles that results from setting the optimal imi-
tation cost KW = 0 is (see Section 3)
W exog =


   1
SD + 2D
M
  1

I

y
YL

.
Proposition 6 identies the optimal welfare achieved assuming endogenous innovation (provided
i) the static entry incentive is excessive and ii) SM=M  
 ()) as being bounded below by
W endog =


   1
 SM
M
I

y
YL

.
Using condition i), i.e. (SD + 2D)  (SM + D) < D,
W exog 


   1

SM + D
M
+ 1

  1

I

y
YL

.
A su¢ cient condition for welfare to be greater with endogenous innovation is therefore

   1
 SM
M
 
   1

SM + D
M
+ 1

  1.
Regrouping terms and dividing by = (   1) gives 

   1
 1
  1
!
SM
M
 D
M
+
1

.
Using the second condition to substitute a lower bound for SM=M gives the su¢ cient condition,
3
2
 D
M
+
1

so optimal welfare is higher with endogenous innovation if M=D  , i.e. if the degree of
product market competition is su¢ ciently large.
43
A.10 Proposition 10 (takeovers and licensing)
Before establishing the proposition we verify the claim made in the text, i.e. that attrition does
not occur if M=D   + 1. Consider the limiting case K = 0. The leader payo¤ LT (Y ) is
maximized at the threshold YT = ( (r   ) I) =((   1)(M   D)). The investment game is
(weakly) preemptive if LT (YT )  F (YT ), that is if
M   D
r    YT   I

y
YT

 D
r   YT

y
YT

which yields the desired condition on M=D.
To establish the proposition we rst verify that a takeover is the preferred instrument. The
condition LT (Y )  LL (Y ) works out to
M   D
r    max fY; YF g  KI

y
max fY; YF g



D
r    max fY; YF g  K  KI

y
max fY; YF g

which holds because of the e¢ ciency e¤ect M > 2D.
That takeovers increase rm prot for K < bK follows from LT (Y ) > L(Y ) and the rent
dissipation property of attrition and preemption.
Similarly, licensing (providedKI > 0) increases rm prot while leaving the timing of imitation
unchanged. It therefore remains to verify that licensing results in earlier innovation. Let bKL < bK
denote the critical threshold that separates attrition and preemption in the presence of licensing,
which solves LL (YL) = F (YF ) (as licensing only has a level e¤ect on the leader payo¤ for Y < YF
the payo¤ LL is maximized at YL). For K  bKL, as LL (Y ) > L(Y ) allowing licensing results in
innovation at a threshold that is either lower than the preemption threshold without licensing or
weakly lower than the previous possible innovation thresholds. Otherwise if K < bKL, the industry
is in an attrition regime both with and without licensing and the distribution of innovation
thresholds shifts left with licensing.
B Dynamic representation of the investment game
To represent the investment game whose normal form is studied in Section 4 in continuous
time, assume that the feasible investment strategies of rms are rst-hitting times  (Yi) :=
inf ft  0 jYt  Yi g. This applies for instance if managerial decisions consist of hurdle rates
((YiM= (r   )) =I)   1 for innovative investment. Then the distributions of investment times
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are ordered by the investment thresholds Yi and the investment game is isomorphic that in Fu-
denberg and Tirole [10]. Their analysis applies verbatim, by dening extended mixed strategies
over investment thresholds instead of time.26
B.1 Strategies and payo¤s
In the dynamic representation of the investment game the continuation payo¤s depend on the
current state of the stochastic process y 2 R+ and are accordingly denoted Ly (Y ), F y (Y ) and
My(Y ).
An extended mixed strategy for player i 2 f1; 2g in state y is a pair of real-valued functions
(Gyi ; 
y
i ) : [y;1) [y;1)! [0; 1] [0; 1] such that (a) Gyi is non-decreasing and right-continuous,
(b) yi (Y ) > 0 ) Gyi (Y ) = 1, (c) yi is right-di¤erentiable and (d) if yi (Y ) = 0 and Y =
inf fZ  Y; yi (Z) > 0g then yi has positive right-derivative at Y .
Let Gy i (Y ) := limZ!Y   G
y
i (Z) denote the left-hand limit of G
y
i (Y ), a
y
i (Y ) = G
y
i (Y )  
Gy i (Y ) the magnitude of any jump at Y and set G
y 
i (y) = 0, i = 1; 2. Let Yi (y) =1 if yi (Y ) =
0 for all Y  y and Yi (y) = inf fZ  y; yi (Z) > 0g otherwise, so Y (y) = min fY1 (y) ;Y2 (y)g
denotes the rst threshold at which an investment is certain to occur. Finally let
L(u; v) :=
u(1  v)
u+ v   uv and M (u; v) :=
uv
u+ v   uv .
Firm payo¤s are
V y

(Gyi ; 
y
i ) ;

Gyj ; 
y
j

=24Z maxfY(y) ;yg
y

Ly (s)

1 Gyj (s)

dGyi (s) + F
y (s) (1 Gyi (s)) dGyj (s)

+
X
Z<Y(y)
ayi (Z) a
y
j (Z)M
y(Z)
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+

1 Gy i (Y (y))

1 Gy j (Y (y))

WY(y)

(Gyi ; 
y
i ) ;

Gyj ; 
y
j

,
i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j where
W Y

(Gyi ; 
y
i ) ;

Gyj ; 
y
j

=
ay j (Y )
1 Gy j (Y )
((1  yi (Y ))F y (Y ) + yi (Y )My(Y ))+
1 Gyj (Y )
1 Gy j (Y )
Ly (Y )
26Steg and Thijssen [24] study an investment game with closed-loop stopping times strategies and obtain similar
equilibrium outcomes. Their framework accounts for the process exiting the attrition region, whereas with rst-
hitting time strategies rms remain within the attrition region once it has been attained even if the value of the
process subsequently exits.
45
if Yi (y) < Yj (y),
=
ay i (Y )
1 Gy i (Y )

1  yj (Y )

Ly (Y ) + yj (Y )M
y(Y )

+
1 Gyi (Y )
1 Gy i (Y )
F y (Y )
if Yi (y) > Yj (y) and
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
My(Y ), ayi (Y ) = a
y
j (Y ) = 1
L(a
y
i (Y ); a
y
j (Y ))L
y (Y ) + yL(a
y
j (Y ); a
y
i (Y ))F
y (Y )
+yM (a
y
i (Y ); a
y
j (Y ))M
y (Y ) ,
0 < ayi (Y ) + a
y
j (Y ) < 2
(ayi (Y ))
0
Ly(Y )+(ayj (Y ))
0
F y(Y )
(ayi (Y ))
0
+(ayj (Y ))
0 , a
y
i (Y ) + a
y
j (Y ) = 0
if Yi (y) = Yj (y).
For given y, a pair of simple strategies ((Gy1; 
y
1) ; (G
y
2; 
y
2)) is a Nash equilibrium if (G
y
i ; 
y
i )
maximizes V y

(Gyi ; 
y
i ) ;

Gyj ; 
y
j

, i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j. A collection of simple strategies ((Gyi (Y ) ; yi (Y )))y>0
is consistent if for y  Y  Z, Gyi (Z) = Gyi (Y )+ (1 Gyi (Y ))GYi (Z) and yi (Z) = Yi (Z). The
consistent strategies ((Gy1 (Y ) ; 
y
1 (Y )))y>0 and ((G
y
2 (Y ) ; 
y
2 (Y )))y>0 are a perfect equilibrium if
the simple strategies (Gy1 (Y ) ; 
y
1 (Y )) and (G
y
2 (Y ) ; 
y
2 (Y )) are a Nash equilibrium for every y.
B.2 Equilibrium
In the closure of the attrition range (K  bK) rms do not resort to extended mixed strategies.
Equilibrium strategies are therefore obtained from the unconditional strategies G(Y ) or G(Y )
(see Section A.3) according to whether K  bK or eK < K < bK. Therefore, letting Gy(Y ) :=
G(Y ) G(y)
1 G(y) and G
y
(Y ) :=
G(Y ) G(y)
1 G(y) , (G
y
i (Y ) ; 
y
i (Y )) = (G
y
(Y ); 0) and (G
y
i (Y ) ; 
y
i (Y )) =
Gy(Y ); 0

are symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in these two subcases.
In the preemption range (K > bK) the rms do resort to extended mixed strategies and there
are two subcases that we consider successively.
B.2.1 bK < K < I
This is the case represented in Figure 3 whose key features are that the preemption range (over
which Ly(Y ) > F y(Y )) is the bounded interval
 
YP ; Y P
  (YP ; YF ), and that if a threshold
beyond this range is reached, rms play a waiting game as F y(Y ) > Ly(Y ) for Y > Y P . In a
dynamic representation of the game, subgame perfect equilibrium strategies must account for this
possibility.
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At any y > Y P the payo¤ to leading lies below the follower payo¤. It is not monotonic
however, and there exists a unique threshold Y L 2
 
Y P ; YF

such that Ly (Y L) = L
y (YM ). The
leader payo¤ is decreasing only over
 
Y P ; Y L
[ (YM ;1), and it is this range that constitutes the
support of mixed strategies. The attrition subgame is then solved similarly to the eK < K < bK
case in Section A.3 yielding unconditional distributions
G (Y ) = 1  exp
Z Y
Y P
[Ly(s)]0
F (max fY; YF g)  Ly(s)ds
and
G (Y ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0, Y < Y P
G (Y ) , Y P  Y  Y L
G (Y L) , Y L < Y < YM
G (Y L) + (1 G (Y L))G (Y ) , Y  YM
so that the conditional distribution is Gy(Y ) :=
G(Y ) G(y)
1 G(y) .
If y lies in the preemption range, the reasoning is standard and results in rms investing
immediately and using the strategy extensions to coordinate simultaneous investment.
Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium strategies are (Gyi (Y ); 
y
i (Y )) with
Gyi (Y ) =
8>><>>:
0, Y < YP
1, YP  Y < Y P
Gy(Y ), Y  Y P
,
yi (Y ) =
8>><>>:
0, Y < YP
Ly(Y ) F y(Y )
Ly(Y ) My(Y ) , YP  Y < Y P
0, Y  Y P
for i 2 f1; 2g.
B.2.2 bK  I
Here Ly(Y ) > F y(Y ) over (YP ; YF ) so the investment game is a standard preemption game. A
specicity of the investment game studied here is that for K > I, My lies strictly above F y over
[YF ;1). Symmetric equilibrium strategies are nevertheless those of a standard real option game,
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yielding (Gyi (Y ); 
y
i (Y )) with
Gyi (Y ) =
(
0, Y < YP
1, Y  YP
,
yi (Y ) =
8>><>>:
0, Y < YP
Ly(Y ) F y(Y )
Ly(Y ) My(Y ) , YP  Y < YF
1, Y  YF
for i 2 f1; 2g.
48
YL
F
L
L,M
YF
E(V ) = L(YM )
F (YF )
YM
L(YL)
Figure 1 Attrition (K < K˜): YM is a global maximum of the leader payoﬀ, innovation
thresholds are distributed over [YM ,∞), and imitation occurs immediately after, for an
equilibrium value E(V ) = L(YM ).
YL
E(V ) = L(YL) F
L
L,M
YFY L YM
F (YF )
L(YM )
Figure 2 Attrition (K˜ ≤ K < K̂): YL is a global maximum of the leader payoﬀ, innovation
thresholds are distributed over
[
YL, Y L
] ∪ [YM ,∞), imitation occurs either at YF if the
innovation threshold is in
[
YL, Y L
]
, or immediately otherwise, for an equilibrium value
E(V ) = L(YL).
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YL
E(V ) = F (YF ) F
L
L,M
YFYP Y P YM
L(YL)
L(YM )
Figure 3 Preemption (K̂ ≤ K < I): innovation occurs at YP and imitation at YF , for an
equilibrium value E(V ) = F (YF ). There is attrition oﬀ the equilibrium path (over (Y P ,∞)).
YL
E(V ) = F (YF )
F
L
L,M
YFYP
L(YL)
Figure 4 Standard preemption (I ≤ K): innovation occurs at YP and imitation at YF , for an
equilibrium value E(V ) = F (YF ) (for clarity M(Y ) is graphed only on [YF ,∞)).
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